Kur’ân-ı Kerim, Allah’u Teâlâ tarafından Peygamber Efendimiz aracılığı ile insanlığa iletilmiş olan bir hidayet kaynağıdır. Okunmasıyla ibadet edilen Kur’ân-ı Kerim’in insanlar tarafından anlaşılması onun tefsiri ile mümkündür. Bununla birlikte Kırâat İlmi de Kur’ân’ın anlaşılması için bilinmesi gereken ve âyetlerin tefsirinde kullanılması gereken önemli ilimlerden birisidir. Kur’ân-ı Kerim kelimelerindeki telaffuz değişikliklerini konu edinen kırâat ilminin tefsir ilmi ile irtibatlı olduğu aşikârdır. Bundan dolayı Kur’ân-ı Kerim’i açıklayan tefsir kitapları ve tefsir âlimleri, kırâatlerden destek almışlar ve âyetlere mana verirken farklı kırâatleri göz önünde (...) bulundurarak anlam zenginliğini sağlamışlardır. Sahih olan kırâatlerin yanında sahih olmayan kırâatler de âyetlerin anlaşılmasında yardımcı olarak kullanılmıştır. Kur’ân kelimelerinde söz konusu olan bu değişiklikler tefsir eserlerinde farklı şekillerde ele alınmış ve incelenmiştir. Kur’ân’ın anlaşılması için kaleme alınan tefsirlerden birisi olan Celâleyn Tefsiri de; kısa, öz, anlaşılır ve çokça istifade edilen bir eserdir. Celâleyn tefsiri aynı zamanda âyetler anlaşılmaya çalışırken kırâatlerin de incelendiği, farklı şekillerde ele alındığı önemli bir tefsir eseridir. Bu ve benzeri nedenlerden dolayı Celâleyn tefsirinin kırâatler açısından incelenmesi, kırâat ve tefsir ilimleri açısından önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Celâleyn Tefsirinde kırâatlerin nasıl kullanıldığı, kırâatlere değinilirken onların nasıl zikredildiği, hangi yönler ile kırâatlere yaklaşıldığı gibi konular değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

Majalla al-Aḥkam al-‘Adliyyah, which is the first example of codification based on Islamic law, has been the subject of criticism from different angles in terms of its preparation and content. The main reasons for criticism are following the casuistic method, being limited to the Hanafi sect, and therefore, the regulations on some issues not meeting the needs of the period, and the lack and excesses that do not comply with the content of the civil law. The commentator of the Majalla, (...) ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, also criticized Majalla from different angles. In this study, it was aimed to identify, describe, and classify Ali Ḥaydar Efendi's critics of the Majalla, and -with some exceptions- no evaluation was made about the criticism of the commentator. Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, the author of the most comprehensive and famous commentary of the Majalla, Dureru'l-hukkâm, criticized the Majalla both in terms of law technique and content, justified his criticisms, and offered alternative suggestions regarding the issues he criticized. Although Ali Ḥaydar Efendi criticized an item for only one reason, he criticized some items from more than one point of view. In the article, each of the criticisms of Ali Ḥaydar Efendi on the Majalla’s items is discussed under a separate heading, and the items criticized from more than one point of view are discussed under a separate heading and exemplified as much as possible. His criticisms of the Majalla in terms of law technique are as follows: The statements of the items are prone to making wrong judgments, not of a general nature, the concepts are not used appropriately, both the concepts and the items are not compatible with each other and with the fiqh books, having some missing, unnecessary or incorrect statements in the items, and the lack of records in the statements. Among the criticisms made in terms of content, first of all, the fact that the provision contained in the article is contrary to the ruling in the fiqh books or the view of the sect should be mentioned. Some of the criticisms in terms of content are related to the preferences made while preparing the Majalla. In this context, it has been the subject of criticism that some of the preferred views are not suitable for the needs of the period or the preferred view in the madhhab, conflicting between preferences from time to time, and not making a choice in some controversial issues. The existence of provisions that do not comply with the requirements of the time, and the asl-far' incompatibility is another reason for criticism. In such criticisms, the suitability of the content of the law with the madhhab books in various aspects has been tried to be revealed, and inappropriate aspects have been criticized. However, ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also pointed out that the text of the law should be prepared by making use of the provisions of different madhhabs, since it does not meet the needs of the time, although it is in accordance with the provisions of the madhhab. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also criticized the Majalla in terms of missing some issues or not being regulated sufficiently, and included provisions regarding the qarḍ contract and crimes against animals, which were not dealt with even though they should have been included in the Majalla. However, he never touched upon the subjects of consumption and ribā, which were not dealt with in the Majalla, although they should have been. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi said that there is a deficiency in the items dealing with subjects such as luqata and hacr, since some conditions regarding these issues are not included. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also criticizes the Majalla in terms of the contradiction between the provisions contained in the items; the lack of unity in language, style and terminology among the items; and unnecessary repetitions both between the items and within the items. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, who did not make any criticism about the repetitions due to the fact that the Majalla was prepared with the casuistic method, justified or criticized the other repetitions and offered suggestions to avoid such repetitions. Also, according to him, there are deliberate repetitions in the Majalla. In addition, he also criticized the Majalla from a systematic point of view, such as the incompatibility of the title and content, the arrangement of similar subjects in different chapters/items/paragraphs, or the handling of different subjects in the same chapter/item/paragraph. Another criticism of ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi about the Majalla is about definitions. He criticizes the definitions made as not being collectively exhaustive, mutually exclusive and not being in the definition technique such as the tautology, but also on the grounds that it is not comprehensive, contrary to the method followed in other definitions made in the Majalla, and not being included in the fiqh books. (shrink)

Attempts to apply the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory to cognition in a systematic way has been well under way since the early 90s and has been recognised as a “third contender” to computationalist and connectionist approaches :441–463, 1996). Nevertheless, it was also realised that such an application will not lead to a solid paradigm as straightforwardly as was initially hoped. In this paper I explicate a method for assessing such proposals by drawing upon Lakatos’s Criticism and the growth (...) of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London, pp 91–195, 1970) methodology of scientific research programs. MSRP focuses on the heuristics of a particular field and gauges the model/theory building stratagems by reference to theoretical and empirical progress, on the one hand, and the continuity and the autonomy of the way the field’s heuristic generates its series of models/theories, on the other. The requirement of continuity and autonomy afford distinct senses of ad hoc-ness, which serve as an effective tool to detect various subtleties which may otherwise be missed: the present approach identifies shortcomings missed by Chemero’s radical embodied cognitive science and falsifies Chemero’s claim that the methodological powers of his model-based account is on a par with computationalism. In general, I claim that MSRP is relevant to current methodological issues in cognitive science and can supplement debates regarding “local” assessments of methodologies, such as that between mechanical versus covering-law explanations. MSRP must at least be viewed as a necessary constraint for any methodological considerations in cognitive science. (shrink)

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

The interactivist model of representation makes foundational criticisms of assumptions concerning representation that have been standard since the pre-Socratics and presents a positive model that differs from others on offer in several ways. The interactivist model of representation (or re- presenting), consequently, does not fit well within standard categories (though it is closest to the general pragmatist framework), and, consequently, is often miscategorized and misunderstood. A recent paper by Gładziejewski (2016) gives us an opportunity to address some of these issues. (...) Gładziejewski presupposes a model of the nature of representation, in a version derived from Ramsey (2007), that is precisely of the sort that the interactivist model argues does not work and is not, in principle, possible. Gładziejewski argues that the interactivist model does not satisfy the desiderata of this kind of model of representation, not taking into account that the interactivist model argues directly against such models and their desiderata. The central (though not the only) point is that Gładziejewski begs the question concerning the interactivist model by assuming precisely what the interactivist model argues is impossible, then charging interactivism with not satisfying these impossible desiderata. By simply accepting the Ramsey framework for understanding and modeling representation, he ignores the arguments against such frameworks, and thereby renders his own arguments circular. (shrink)

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical commentary on Kasher and Yadlin's article. I start with a few remarks regarding the authors? claim about the uniqueness of fighting terrorism and their proposed definition of acts of terrorism. The main part of my commentary, however, is devoted to discussing Kasher and Yadlin's Principle of Distinction (Part II of their paper). There, I raise several objections to their proposed ranking of state duties and to the way they use the ranking to justify what they (...) call targeted prevention of terror. Finally, I make a few remarks pertaining more specifically to the Israeli?Palestinian situation. (shrink)

In this paper, we study an algebraically closed field \ expanded by two unary predicates denoting an algebraically closed proper subfield k and a multiplicative subgroup \. This will be a proper expansion of algebraically closed field with a group satisfying the Mann property, and also pairs of algebraically closed fields. We first characterize the independence in the triple \\). This enables us to characterize the interpretable groups when \ is divisible. Every interpretable group H in \\) is, up to (...) isogeny, an extension of a direct sum of k-rational points of an algebraic group defined over k and an interpretable abelian group in \ by an interpretable group N, which is the quotient of an algebraic group by a subgroup \, which in turn is isogenous to a cartesian product of k-rational points of an algebraic group defined over k and an interpretable abelian group in \. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

In this article we investigate whether non-culpably benefiting from wrongdoing or injustice generates a moral requirement to disgorge these benefits in order to compensate the victims. We argue that a strong requirement to disgorge such benefits is generated only if other conditions or factors are present. We identify three such factors and claim that their presence would explain why the normative features of certain types of cases of benefiting from wrongdoing differ from cases of benefiting from simple misfortune or bad (...) luck. (shrink)

This essay addresses the questions of whether and how much responsibility for extreme poverty should be assigned to global and domestic institutional orders. The main focus is on whether the global order brings about the existing levels of extreme poverty or merely allows them. By examining Thomas Pogge's recent contribution on this topic, I argue that although he builds a plausible case for the claim that the global order brings about, and not merely fails to prevent, extreme poverty, the moral (...) and empirical complexity of the situation leaves room for doubting his conclusions. I conclude, however, that it is enough that there be a reasonable chance—though not conclusive evidence—that the global order brings about the existing extreme poverty to reduce considerably the moral weight of its privileged participants' appeal to cost when justifying their not taking steps to alleviate extreme poverty. (shrink)

We study groups definable in tame expansions of ω-stable theories. Assuming several tameness conditions, we obtain structural theorems for groups definable and interpretable in these expansions. As our main example, by characterizing independence in the pair, where K is an algebraically closed field and G is a multiplicative subgroup of K× with the Mann property, we show that the pair satisfies the assumptions. In particular, this provides a characterization of definable and interpretable groups in in terms of algebraic groups in (...) K and interpretable groups in G. Furthermore, we compute the Morley rank and the U-rank in and both ranks agree. (shrink)

Judgments of the rationality of beliefs must take the costs of acquiring and possessing beliefs into consideration. In that case, certain false beliefs, especially those that are associated with the benefits of a cohesive community, can be seen to be useful for an agent and perhaps instrumentally rational to hold. A distinction should be made between excusable misbeliefs, which a rational agent should tolerate, and misbeliefs that are defensible in their own right because they confer benefits on the agent. Likely (...) candidates for such misbeliefs are to be found in the realm of nationalism and religion, where the possession costs of true beliefs are high, and where collective beliefs in falsehoods may allow for a cohesive community. We discuss the paradoxes of reflective awareness involved in the idea of deliberately embracing falsehoods. More rigorous, fully reflective concepts of rationality would still disallow false beliefs, but such demanding versions of rationality would commit agents to pay large costs, thereby weakening the motivation for acquiring true beliefs. (shrink)

In the Buddhist tradition, there is an expansive collection of texts that explore the topic of ethics, addressing moral questions concerning the right and wrong behaviors, virtues, vices, and so forth. However, when examining the main texts of this tradition, we find an absence of a structured moral philosophy that systematically and critically analyzes moral values and principles. Therefore, Buddhist scholars have responded in different ways to the perplexing situation in which Buddhism largely lacks an explicit theory in moral philosophy. (...) Some scholars argue that we should read Buddhist moral teachings as one of the contemporary ethical theories, such as consequentialism or virtue ethics. Damien Keown is one of the scholars who claims that “virtue ethics” is the best way to understand Buddhist ethics. This paper analyzes and critiques Damien Kewon’s reading of Buddhist moral teachings as Virtue ethics. I argue that such interpretation poses problems, primarily because it may overlook key aspects of Buddhist beliefs deemed inconsequential to contemporary ethical debates, and secondly, it could result in the imposition of non-authentic Buddhist ideas on Buddhist ethics. (shrink)

Provides an overview of the complex history of the secular tradition of science and its interactions with religions and spiritual traditions.

This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or rejecting the (...) incompatibility thesis, namely the underlying conception of responsibility. There are, I contend, two relevant conceptions of responsibility, the globalist and the localist. In order for the compatibilist argument to go through, the globalist conception must be adopted. I aim to provide a formulation and defence of the dependency of the compatibilist view on the globalist conception of responsibility. I will not, however, argue for one conception of responsibility over the other. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the field of algebraic numbers with a set of elements of small height treated as a predicate. We prove that such structures are not simple and have the independence property. A real algebraic integer is called a Salem number if α and are Galois conjugate and all other Galois conjugates of α lie on the unit circle. It is not known whether 1 is a limit point of Salem numbers. We relate the simplicity of a (...) certain pair with Lehmer's conjecture and obtain a model‐theoretic characterization of Lehmer's conjecture for Salem numbers. (shrink)

Certain enterprises at the fringes of science, such as intelligent design creationism, claim to identify phenomena that go beyond not just our present physics but any possible physical explanation. Asking what it would take for such a claim to succeed, we introduce a version of physicalism that formulates the proposition that all available data sets are best explained by combinations of “chance and necessity”—algorithmic rules and randomness. Physicalism would then be violated by the existence of oracles that produce certain kinds (...) of noncomputable functions. Examining how a candidate for such an oracle would be evaluated leads to questions that do not admit an easy resolution. Since we lack any plausible candidate for any such oracle, however, chance-and-necessity physicalism appears very likely to be correct. (shrink)

We give reasons for our judgements of works of art. (2) Reasons are inherently general, and hence dependent on principles. (3) There are no principles of aesthetic evaluation. Each of these three propositions seems plausible, yet one of them must be false. Illusionism denies (1). Particularism denies (2). Generalism denies (3). We argue that illusionism depends on an unacceptable account of the use of critical language. Particularism cannot account for the connection between reasons and verdicts in criticism. Generalism comes in (...) two forms: reversible generalism is the thesis that there are meaningful generalizations in criticism that admit of exceptions; irreversible generalism is the thesis that such generalizations cannot admit of exceptions. It is argued that Frank Sibley's defence of reversible generalism cannot provide a criterion for distinguishing valenced from non-valenced properties, and thus fails. Irreversible generalism is correct: it is logically cogent and fits our critical practices. (shrink)

Gödel's Theorem is often used in arguments against machine intelligence, suggesting humans are not bound by the rules of any formal system. However, Gödelian arguments can be used to support AI, provided we extend our notion of computation to include devices incorporating random number generators. A complete description scheme can be given for integer functions, by which nonalgorithmic functions are shown to be partly random. Not being restricted to algorithms can be accounted for by the availability of an arbitrary random (...) function. Humans, then, might not be rule-bound, but Gödelian arguments also suggest how the relevant sort of nonalgorithmicity may be trivially made available to machines. (shrink)

Aristotle (b. 322 BC) was the first philosopher in the history of thought to examine all modes and types of belief acquisition such as knowledge, supposition, error and indirectly imagination. In his _Prior Analytics_, which he wrote primarily to clarify his theory of demonstration, Aristotle examined in detail the syllogism, which he saw as the most important form of reasoning, and his analysis was subject to interpretation by different traditions of thought for centuries. Aristotle’s _Prior Analytics_ was translated into Arabic (...) in the classical period and later interpreted by many Islamic logicians. This article aims to show how Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism in the _Prior Analytics_ was taken up and interpreted in the Peripatetic Islamic logical tradition. These interpretations of the definition of the syllogism will provide us with an idea about the unique features of the commentaries on the _Prior Analytics_ in the Islamic world. Here, introductory information about the translation of the _Prior Analytics_ into Arabic and its commentators in Arabic will be given, Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism and its versions in Peripatetic Islamic logicians will be indicated, and the interpretation of the basic terms in the definition by Peripatetic Islamic logicians will be revealed. (shrink)

A model M = (M, E,...) of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF is said to be θ-like, where E interprets ∈ and θ is an uncountable cardinal, if |M| = θ but $|\{b \in M: bEa\}| for each a ∈ M. An immediate corollary of the classical theorem of Keisler and Morley on elementary end extensions of models of set theory is that every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ 1 -like model. Coupled with Chang's two cardinal theorem this implies (...) that if θ is a regular cardinal θ such that $2^{ then every consistent extension of ZF also has a θ + -like model. In particular, in the presence of the continuum hypothesis every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ 2 -like model. Here we prove: THEOREM A. If θ has the tree property then the following are equivalent for any completion T of ZFC: (i) T has a θ-like model. (ii) $\Phi \subseteq T$ , where Φ is the recursive set of axioms {∃ κ(κ is n-Mahlo and "V κ is a Σ n -elementary submodel of the universe"): n ∈ ω}. (iii) T has a λ-like model for every uncountable cardinal λ. THEOREM B. The following are equiconsistent over ZFC: (i) "There exists an ω-Mahlo cardinal". (ii) "For every finite language L, all ℵ 2 -like models of ZFC(L) satisfy the scheme Φ(L). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Scientific Reasons Motivated by Morality? The Science of Religion Notes.

Atheists, conservative theists, and religious liberals often read the history of science in ways that support their own position. Atheists expect continual mutual support between science and nonbelief, conservatives emphasize theistic metaphysical foundations for science; and liberals find a historical development toward separate spheres for science and religion. The rise of science was more complicated than anticipated by any of these stories. Atheism and science have usually developed almost independently, with weak connections. Today, the naturalism of modern scientific descriptions of (...) the world is consonant with an atheistic position. But even now, significant tensions between science and atheism remain. (shrink)

Peter Singer is well known to have argued for our responsibilities to address global poverty based on an analogy with saving a drowning child. Just as the passerby has a duty to save that child, we have a duty to save children ‘drowning’ in poverty. Since its publication, more four decades ago, there have been numerous attempts to grapple with the inescapable moral challenge posed by Singer’s analogy. In this paper, we propose a new approach to the Singerian challenge, through (...) offering a different explanation for why our intuitions about rescuing a threatened person in front of us are more demanding than our intuitions about rescuing those living under equally threatening conditions of poverty. We argue that understanding the underlying motive or mechanism by which people come to endorse intuitions about duties of assistance undermines our confidence in the validity and robustness of some of the highly demanding intuitions that Singer relies on. This, in turn, puts serious limitations on the normative and practical reach of Singer’s analogy. (shrink)